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DIVIDED INFRINGEMENT, ECONOMICS, AND THE COMMON
LAW
Dmitry Karshtedt*
INTRODUCTION
Economic analysis figures prominently in patent law scholarship, and
a recent article by Professor Keith Robinson, Economic Theory, Divided
Infringement, and Enforcing Interactive Patents, follows that approach. 1
But economic analysis, of course, is not unique to the field of patents. In
particular, tort law scholars have embraced the law-and-economics
tradition in a prominent way. One well-known example is then-Professor
Richard Posner’s 1972 article, A Theory of Negligence, which set forth
the thesis that the rules of negligence created by common-law courts are
economically efficient. 2 More generally, commentators like Professors
George Priest 3 and Paul Rubin 4 have argued that legal rules developed
by the common-law process must converge, and have converged, on
principles that promote economic efficiency. While not uncontroversial,
this view is by now well-established. For example, Professor Jody Kraus
noted “an ‘impressive level of fit’ between results of economic analysis
and case outcomes under common-law rules.” 5 This phenomenon can be

* Associate Professor, George Washington University Law School. I thank Dan Burk,
Bernard Chao, Kevin Collins, Gregory Dolin, Timothy Holbrook, Daniel Kazhdan, Irina Manta,
Andrew Michaels, Sean Pager, Jason Rantanen, Jason Reinecke, and Keith Robinson for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Response. I am also grateful to Ashley Cade for
outstanding research assistance.
1. W. Keith Robinson, Economic Theory, Divided Infringement, and Enforcing Interactive
Patents, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1961 (2015).
2. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33 (1972).
3. George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 65, 68 (1977) (stating that legal disputes that proceed to judgment will naturally
evolve to entrench rules that promote efficiency).
4. Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 61 (1977)
(proposing that parties will litigate over inefficient common-law rules rather than efficient ones,
thereby driving the common law toward efficiency).
5. Dmitry Karshtedt, Enhancing Patent Damages, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1427, 1513
(2018) (quoting Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A
Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287, 357 (2007)). But
cf. Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 583, 584 (1992)
(challenging the proposed relationship between efficiency and the common law); see also Bruce
A. Ackerman, Law, Economics, and the Problem of Legal Culture, 1986 DUKE L.J. 929, 934
(stating that “[t]he seminal point [that the common law converges upon economically efficient
rules], first made by George Priest and Paul Rubin, has a solid core on common sense,” but then
proceeding to criticize this view) (citations omitted).
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explained by selection effects, 6 ideological predilections of judges, 7 or
even by the intuition that courts care about the economic consequences
of their decisions. 8
Although primarily empirical, Posner’s article contains unmistakable
normative overtones. Thus, in the beginning of the article, Posner
maintained that “the dominant function of the fault system is to generate
rules of liability that if followed will bring about, at least approximately,
the efficient—the cost-justified—level of accidents and safety.” 9 He
further explained that, “[b]ecause we do not like to see resources
squandered, a judgment of negligence has inescapable overtones of moral
disapproval, for it implies that there was a cheaper alternative to the
accident” and that, “[c]onversely, there is no moral indignation in the case
in which the cost of prevention would have exceeded the cost of the
accident.” 10 The proper role of economics in guiding the rules of civil
liability is subject to vigorous debate, 11 but it is difficult to dispute that
efficiency can be a good thing in at least some circumstances. One area
of law where economic efficiency is thought by many to be paramount is
patent law: “[t]here is widespread agreement that the reason we have a
patent system is utilitarian,” 12 and, specifically, economic-utilitarian.
Of course, the goals of tort law and patent law are different—the
former is, at least in the minds of economically-minded thinkers, intended
6. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 3, at 68 (“[I]f the disputes that proceed to judgment consist
of a disproportionately large share which contest the appropriateness of inefficient rules, then the
set of rules not contested, those remaining in force, will consist of a disproportionately large share
of efficient rules.”); cf. Clifford G. Holderness, A Legal Foundation for Exchange, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 322, 344 n.70 (1985) (noting some inefficiencies among common-law rules).
7. Jack M. Balkin, Too Good to Be True: The Positive Economic Theory of Law, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 1447, 1479–80 (1987) (reviewing WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987)).
8. See generally Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979).
9. Posner, supra note 2, at 33 (emphasis added).
10. Id.
11. For a leading critique, see ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 3–4 (1995). See
also Balkin, supra note 7, at 1447–48; John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as
Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 985–86 (2010); Karshtedt, supra note 5, at 1513–14 (discussing
various strands of skepticism of economic theories of tort law).
12. David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for
Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMPLE L. REV. 181, 182 (2009). See generally Peter S.
Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
129, 130 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). For a recent prominent dissenting
view, see ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2–3 (2011). Cf. Tun-Jen
Chiang, Competing Visions of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1858, 1873–84
(2014) (suggesting that there is a strong non-utilitarian streak behind patentable subject matter
exclusions under the Patent Act’s § 101, which manifests itself with particular salience in recent
Supreme Court cases).
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to optimize the costs of accidents, while the latter serves to optimize
incentives for technological innovation. 13 But both areas of law are
particularly amenable to economic analysis, and in studying both the
question whether prevalent legal rules are consistent with the goal of
achieving economic efficiency, however defined, is well worth asking. In
the past several decades, patent scholars have productively applied
economic analysis to questions involving patent scope, 14 the
nonobviousness requirement of patentability, 15 and remedies for patent
infringement. 16 As its title suggests, Professor Keith Robinson’s recent
article is written in that tradition. 17 Using three leading economic theories
of patent law, Professor Robinson examines various legal tests that courts
have developed to deal with so-called “divided infringement.” 18 I am
gratified to be offered an opportunity to respond to his article and to
examine further the problem that he addresses. In particular, looking at
patent doctrine through the lens of the common law efficiency thesis, I
apply and extend the framework developed by Professor Robinson to
recent developments in the law of patent infringement.
The rest of this Response proceeds as follows. Part I explains so-called
“method claims” in patent law, describes the legal challenges that arise
when multiple parties are involved in their potential infringement, and
outlines the approach of Professor Robinson’s article. Part II examines
multi-party patent infringement liability from the perspective of
established common-law attribution rules, which likely reflect the goals
of economic efficiency, and applies these rules to the problem of divided
infringement. Specifically, this Part examines the economic implications
of the common-law principle of causal responsibility, which I described
and applied to patent law in a recent article, 19 within Professor
13. See Dmitry Karshtedt, Causal Responsibility and Patent Infringement, 70 VAND. L.
REV. 565, 620–21 (2017) (comparing the instrumental goals of patent law and tort law).
14. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 842 (1990); see also Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual
Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1046–57 (2005).
15. See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability,
120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1597 (2011).
16. See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Damages Rules in
Intellectual Property Law, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1585, 1588–90 (1998) (discussing damages
rules in intellectual property litigation); Keith N. Hylton, Enhanced Damages for Patent
Infringement: A Normative Approach, 36 REV. LITIG. 417, 421–28 (2017) (discussing various
economic functions of enhanced damages); Carl Shapiro, Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent
Royalties, 12 AM. L. ECON. REV. 280, 285–86 (2010). See generally Ted Sichelman, Purging
Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517 (2014) (reimagining patent remedies
as a driver of innovation incentives).
17. See Robinson, supra note 1.
18. Id.
19. See Karshtedt, supra note 13.
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Robinson’s framework. The Response then concludes.
I. METHOD CLAIMS AND MULTI-PARTY PATENT INFRINGEMENT
Professor Robinson is to be commended for engaging economic
analysis to probe one of the most vexing issues to face courts in patent
cases in the last ten or so years—the problem of divided infringement. 20
The problem stems from the rules of enforcement of patent rights. In
order to prevail against alleged infringers, patentees must prove that the
products the defendants make or sell, or the activities the defendants
engage in, 21 fall within the scope of the patent’s claims. Claims, which
are numbered sentences at the end of the patent, 22 are initially drafted by
the patent applicant and then subjected to examination by the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO) for compliance with patentability
requirements. During examination, the original claims often undergo
changes, or amendments, and issue in final form if the PTO examiner
allows the patent and the applicant pays an issue fee. Although, as some
have noted, 23 the section of the Patent Act governing infringement does
not mention patent claims, claims are fundamental to patent infringement
analysis. 24 As a matter of law, a patent cannot be infringed unless the
accused product or activity meets every element of the asserted claim.25
But what happens when all the elements are met, but more than one entity
is involved in the infringement?
Courts have had a great deal of difficulty with this question,
particularly in cases in which the claims at issue are drawn to “methods,”
or activities, as opposed to products or systems. 26 While product claims
20. See generally Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255
(2005).
21. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
22. See Karshtedt, supra note 13, at 577 (discussing patent claims).
23. See, e.g., Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2012); see also Andres Sawicki, The Central Claiming Renaissance, 103
CORNELL L. REV. 645, 716 (2018).
24. See, e.g., AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See
generally Giles S. Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims—American
Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497 (1990).
25. See, e.g., Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 949 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(en banc).
26. In cases involving apparatus or system claims, courts have for a time appeared to
converge on a stable solution. See Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 631
F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that direct infringement by the end user lies when it
“control[s] the system as a whole and obtain[s] benefit from” the system) (citation omitted);
Timothy R. Holbrook, Method Patent Exceptionalism, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1044 (2017)
(discussing this result); Karshtedt, supra note 13, at 579–80. But see Intell. Ventures I LLC v.
Motorola Mobility LLC, 870 F.3d 1320, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (concluding that “proof of an
infringing ‘use’ of the claimed system under § 271(a) requires the patentee to demonstrate that
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recite the product’s structural elements—for example, “a table
comprising a top and legs”—method claims recite steps of the activity
using gerunds—for example, “a method of using a door, comprising
installing the door into a doorway, inserting a key into a latch, turning the
key, twisting the door handle, and applying pressure to the door.”27
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the defendant is a door
manufacturer who makes doors equipped with locks, installs the doors in
customers’ homes, and provides keys to the customers. As the law stood
in the beginning of August 2015, on these facts there could be no liability
as a matter of law for infringement of the hypothetical claim to using a
door. This is because the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, the court with exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases, had held
that for the infringement of a method claim to lie, a single entity must
have performed all the steps of the claim. 28 Because the manufacturer
carries out the installing step and the customer, the rest, the performance
here is “divided” between two parties—hence, the term “divided
infringement.” 29 Early versions of the so-called “single entity rule,”
which governs such scenarios, commanded that the claim on the method
of using a door is basically unenforceable because it can never be
infringed. 30
Under a particularly rigid form of the single-entity regime, the Federal
Circuit might still allow claim steps performed by a third party to be
attributed to the defendant, but only in extremely limited circumstances:
when the third party was the defendant’s agent or was obligated to
perform the steps under a contract with the defendant, a test that I call

the direct infringer obtained ‘benefit’ from each and every element of the claimed system”)
(citation omitted).
27. I first developed this example in Karshtedt, supra note 13, at 577–78.
28. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 786 F.3d 899, 909 (Fed. Cir.), rev’d
en banc, 797 F.3d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam). For the purposes of this example, I am
assuming that the manufacturer is not obligated to install the door by contract—otherwise, the
customers might be liable for patent infringement on these facts under the Federal Circuit’s
approach prior to August 2015.
29. See generally Lemley et al., supra note 20.
30. See Damon Gupta, Virtually Uninfringeable: Valid Patents Lacking Protection Under
the Single Entity Rule, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 61, 62 (2012); see also W. Keith
Robinson, No “Direction” Home: An Alternative Approach to Joint Infringement, 62 AM. U. L.
REV. 59, 59 (2012). The claim, however, could be infringed if the customer rather than the
manufacturer installed the door—because then, a single entity (the customer) would have
performed every step of the claim. For an argument that limited enforcement of method claims
may be a proper consequence of the patentee’s claim drafting choices, see Jason Rantanen, The
Exceptional Nature of Method Claims: A Response to Professor Holbrook, 102 IOWA L. REV.
ONLINE 293 (2017).
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“Test A1.” 31 Not long before Professor Robinson’s article was to go to
press, however, the Federal Circuit expanded the range of circumstances
in which attribution was possible in the well-known case of Akamai
Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. 32 In doing so, the court
turned to tort principles: it concluded that a defendant could be liable for
infringement when the steps were divided between the defendant and a
third party as long as the relationship between them warranted the
defendant’s “vicarious liability” for the third party’s acts (for reasons that
will become clear, I call this test “Test A2”), 33 or when it formed a joint
enterprise with the third party (“Test B”). 34 For the latter route to liability,
the court provided a four-element test borrowed from the Restatement of
Torts:
1. an agreement, express or implied, among the
members of the group [i.e., the defendant and the
third party];
2. a common purpose to be carried out by the group;
3. a community of pecuniary interest in that purpose,
among the members; and
4. an equal right to voice in the direction of the
enterprise, which gives an equal right of control. 35
In contrast, the A2 test of liability would be satisfied “when an alleged
infringer conditions [the third party’s] participation in an activity or
receipt of a benefit upon performance of a step or steps of a patented
method and establishes the manner or timing of that performance.” 36 This
route must allow for a broader scope of liability than the old agency-orcontract rule (Test A1) because neither agency nor a contractual
obligation was at issue in Akamai, and because the joint enterprise rule
31. This test has sometimes also been described as the “direction-or-control” test. See
Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In his article,
Professor Robinson occasionally refers to a “mastermind” test, see Robinson, supra note 1, at
2024, perhaps suggesting that it is a separate test from Test A1. But Federal Circuit opinions
appear to have the same test (Test A1) in mind whether they refer to “mastermind” or “directionor-control” tests. Cf. Robinson, supra note 1, at 1973–74 (discussing this case law).
32. 797 F.3d 1020.
33. Id. at 1022–23.
34. Id. at 1023.
35. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 491 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1965)). The
joint enterprise is a special version of the joint venture. Both are “species of partnership,” but joint
enterprise differs from joint venture in that it “does not necessarily involve a profit-and-losssharing arrangement.” 2 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., DOBBS’ LAW OF TORTS § 435 (2d ed. 2011); see
Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479, 482 n.2 (Minn. 1979).
36. Akamai, 797 F.3d at 1023.
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(Test B) was not implicated by the case’s facts. 37 Relative to Test B, the
contours of Test A2 are arguably more significant because joint enterprise
scenarios occur infrequently. 38 At various times, the Federal Circuit
indicated that both Tests A1 and A2 reflect the tort principle of vicarious
liability, a state of affairs suggesting that the court has found it
challenging to pin down that concept—and explains my A1/A2
nomenclature. 39
In his article, Professor Robinson squarely addresses the question that
has been lurking in the background in cases like Akamai: whether
effective enforcement of so-called “interactive” patents—in other words,
patents that only include method claims implicating multiple actors and
thus potentially give rise to a divided infringement problem, would serve
the patent system’s goal of optimizing incentives for technological
innovation. He concludes that “all three prevalent economic theories of
the patent system—(1) reward theory, (2) prospect theory, and (3) rentdissipation theory—support the enforcement of interactive patents.”40
The question is, how vigorous should that enforcement be? Professor
Robinson examines the effects of the various act-attribution tests on the
liability for infringement of interactive patents that the Federal Circuit
has tried to deploy in recent years, or that individual judges proposed in
non-controlling opinions, through the lens of the three most significant
economic theories of patent law. 41 The doctrinal approaches he discusses
range from the most anti-enforcement—the agency-or-contract theory
37. To be sure, there were contracts between the service provider and users in this case, but
the users were not obligated to perform any steps on the service provider’s behalf, but rather had
to perform the steps if they wanted to benefit from the service. See id. at 1024; see also infra note
96 and accompanying text.
38. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
39. See Akamai, 797 F.3d 1020, 1022; Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318,
1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008); BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
40. Robinson, supra note 1, at 1961.
41. One complication not addressed in this Response is the difference between actattribution and liability-shifting, an issue I discussed at length in Causal Responsibility and Patent
Infringement. See Karshtedt, supra note 13. Technically, vicarious liability is a liability-shifting
doctrine, but the Federal Circuit uses it as an act-attribution doctrine since the liability of end
users, unlike that of employees in vicarious liability cases, is not on the table in divided
infringement cases. See id. at 595; see also Akamai, 797 F.3d at 1022 n.2 (calling vicarious
liability a “misnomer” in this context). Joint enterprise is probably also best understood as a
liability-shifting doctrine. See, e.g., Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479, 482 (Minn. 1979) (“The
first issue for consideration is whether the defendants were engaged in a joint enterprise while
hunting. If they were, plaintiff argues, the negligence of [the hunter who actually caused damage]
should be imputed to the remaining defendants.”). In contrast, the innocent agency doctrine,
discussed below, is clearly an act-attribution doctrine because, as its name suggests, it does not
require the possibility of imposition of liability on a party other than the defendant. See infra notes
74–89 and accompanying text; see also Karshtedt, supra note 13, at 606–07.
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(Test A1)—to the most pro-enforcement, the “all-steps” test described in
Judge Newman’s dissenting opinion from the 2012 iteration of Akamai
(“Test D”). 42 The latter test arguably requires only a minimal connection
between the defendant and the third party that carries out the remaining
steps. 43 The other two tests that he addresses are the so-called “partialinducement” test (“Test C”), which the Federal Circuit adopted in its
2012 opinion that was reversed by the Supreme Court in 2014,44 as well
as the joint enterprise test described above (Test B). 45 In this Response, I
focus the discussion on Tests A1, A2, and B—as well as my own
proposed test that will be defined below—because Tests C and D are
unlikely to be adopted at this stage.
Ultimately, while Professor Robinson observes that “no single theory
provides a consistent doctrinal answer,” 46 he concludes that “the doctrinal
solution that seems to be consistent with all the economic theories
discussed is . . . [the] joint-enterprise test,” 47 Test B. But, as suggested
above, facts giving rise to the application of that test seldom come up—
indeed, Test B would have been relevant in just one out of nearly a dozen
cases involving divided infringement in the ten years or so that the
Federal Circuit has been grappling with this problem. 48 Most of the action
in this area has implicated manufacturer-customer relationships, where
the manufacturer is the defendant and the customer is the third party,
rather than joint-enterprise setups. These cases therefore triggered either
Test A1 or A2, with infringement claims usually failing under A1 but
potentially succeeding under A2. 49 Another type of a relationship
appearing in divided infringement cases is the doctor-patient

42. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1331–32 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014).
43. See id. at 1332.
44. Id. at 1306 (majority opinion). Under this test, to be liable for infringement, the
defendant must have, with knowledge of the patent, intended a third party to carry out the steps
of the claim that it did not itself perform. Id. at 1308–10. In addition, under this approach, a
defendant who did not itself carry out any claim steps but intended, with knowledge of the patent,
for two or more entities to perform all the steps between them is also liable. Id. at 1306, 1318–19.
Liability under Test C is rooted in 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). See id. at 1311–14.
45. Akamai, 797 F.3d at 1023.
46. Robinson, supra note 1, at 2028.
47. Id.
48. See Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., 614 F.3d 1367, 1369–73 (Fed. Cir.
2010), overruled by Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020, 1022 n.1
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam). There is no indication that the ratio for unappealed district
court decisions is any different.
49. See Karshtedt, supra note 13, at 592–97.
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relationship, 50 to which the A1-A2 suite of “vicarious liability” tests fits
uneasily 51 and Test B is irrelevant. 52 Nonetheless, vicarious liability has
been the focus of divided infringement jurisprudence, and in a doctorpatient case recently decided by the Federal Circuit, the plaintiff
prevailed under Test A2. 53
With respect to the latest Akamai opinion, Professor Robinson focuses
mainly on Test B, the joint enterprise theory, and says less about Test A2,
the vicarious liability theory underlying the latest expansion of actattribution to the “benefit” and “manner or timing” 54 scenarios beyond
agency and contract. Professor Robinson cannot be faulted for the
omission: While some Federal Circuit judges at least gave hints about the
joint enterprise theory in earlier opinions, 55 the contours of the court’s
new take on vicarious liability could not have been predicted. Indeed, the
court issued its August 2015 en banc opinion in Akamai
contemporaneously with granting the plaintiff’s petition for rehearing en
banc, 56 and thus with no prior indication of the contours of a possible new
test. 57
But what of the economic implications of Test A2? For two reasons,
I will not speculate on how Professor Robinson would have come out in
terms of this test’s adequacy under the three economic theories of patent
law that he addresses in his article. First, I think that it would be only fair
to let Professor Robinson answer that question himself, perhaps in a
follow-on publication. And second, I do not feel completely up to the task
because I am not fully clear on the contours of Test A2.
Traditional tort-law conception of vicarious liability is clear enough.
As I noted in a previous article, Causal Responsibility and Patent
Infringement, “employer liability for tortious acts of its employees,
committed in the scope of employment, is the paradigmatic application
50. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Parenteral Meds., Inc., 845 F.3d 1357, 1362–63 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (holding that performance of self-treatment steps by patients is attributable to
physicians under the Akamai standard).
51. See Rachel E. Sachs, Divided Infringement and the Doctor-Patient Relationship 6–7
(May 9, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2777639; see also Karshtedt,
supra note 13, at 638–41.
52. Cf. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (en banc) (Linn, J., dissenting), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014) (explaining that there is
nothing “to indicate that the . . . health care providers [at issue in a companion case to Akamai]
act in any joint enterprise with their patients”).
53. See Eli Lilly, 845 F.3d at 1368.
54. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(en banc) (per curiam).
55. See Akamai, 692 F.3d 1301 at 1349-51.
56. Id.; see Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 612 F. App’x 617 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (en banc) (per curiam).
57. By then, Professor Robinson’s article was in advanced editing stages.
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of the vicarious liability doctrine.” 58 But, I continued, “a customer or user
is not an employee, and even when vicarious liability is not predicated on
an employer-employee relationship, its hallmark is the defendant’s ‘right
and ability to supervise’ another party.” 59 I concluded that “[t]his
doctrine . . . does not fit the manufacturer-customer scenarios [at issue in
cases like Akamai], for one generally has no right or ability to supervise
one’s customers.” 60 Because the Federal Circuit’s approach to vicarious
liability is somewhat at odds with the established common-law
understanding of vicarious liability in tort, more cases as data points
setting forth the contours of this new attribution theory (i.e., Test A2) are
needed before one can hazard any analysis of its implications on
innovation. 61
II. THE UBIQUITY AND EFFICIENCY OF COMMON-LAW ATTRIBUTION
RULES
Putting to one side the Federal Circuit’s questionable treatment of
vicarious liability, I nonetheless believe that established common-law
rules can be of great utility in patent cases. Specifically, an examination
of some well-defined attribution mechanisms that common-law courts
have developed in tort cases can help courts deciding patent cases deal
with the problem of divided infringement. To begin, there might be at
least two reasons that the Federal Circuit has already properly looked to
the common law to resolve doctrinal difficulties in patent law. 62 First,
because Congress passed the 1952 Patent Act 63 against the background
of the common law, and left numerous gaps in the statute unfilled,
incorporating common-law principles into patent law seems correct as a
matter of statutory interpretation. 64 Second, and perhaps more important,
58. See Karshtedt, supra note 13, at 595.
59. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. Id.
61. For a recent example, see Travel Sentry, Inc. v. Tropp, 877 F.3d 1370, 1380–85 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (reversing the grant of summary judgment of noninfringement because, viewing the
facts in light most favorable to the patentee, the defendant could be vicariously liable for execution
of the claim steps performed by a third party because of various ways in which it had “the right
and ability to stop or limit” the performance of those steps (quoting Akamai Techs., Inc. v.
Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam) (citing
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005)))).
62. See Karshtedt, supra note 5, at 1432–34.
63. Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792, 811 (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. § 271 (2012)).
64. See, e.g., Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 538 (2013) (“When a
statute covers an issue previously governed by the common law, we must presume that Congress
intended to retain the substance of the common law.”) (alterations and quotation marks omitted)
(Breyer, J.); Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 417 (2011) (“start[ing] from the premise that
when Congress creates a federal tort it adopts the background of general tort law”) (Scalia, J.);

2018]

DIVIDED INFRINGMENT, ECONOMICS, AND THE COMMON LAW

339

is the thesis advanced by some law-and-economics scholars that
common-law rules converge upon economic efficiency. 65 Even if the
claim that all of tort law, or even all of the common law, tends toward
economic efficiency is probably too strong, 66 it seems likely that theories
of liability and act-attribution widely accepted throughout the common
law reflect economic efficiency principles. At least in the absence of
evidence suggesting that some established theory is a bad fit for patent
law, it makes sense for courts to adopt this theory in patent cases—an
area of law in which we generally seek economic efficiency. 67 This is
particularly so when the principle in question is of practically universal
application, creating liability for torts as different as trespass and products
liability, and even governing criminal liability. 68
One example of such a theory might be joint enterprise, which the
Federal Circuit unanimously accepted in Akamai. 69 Indeed, one judge has
noted that “the principles of joint venture . . . have [] been applied across
a wide range of torts and other legal wrongs.” 70 In the tort context,
moreover, this theory has been amply justified on economic grounds. 71
Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1429–33 (3d Cir. 1994)
(recognizing the incorporation of common-law principles in setting forth the scope of liability
under a federal statute); see also William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation,
130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1104–08 (2017) (analyzing the role of the common law in interpreting
statutory language).
65. See supra notes 5–17 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text.
67. Cf. Karshtedt, supra note 5, at 1492–93, 1513–16 (making a similar argument in the
context of mental states for punitive damages).
68. See Karshtedt, supra note 13, at 575–76, 615–21.
69. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(en banc) (per curiam).
70. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 969 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring),
vacated, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc); see also id. at 971 (“The status of joint liability
as a general principle of law is supported not only by international law sources but also by the fact
that it is fundamental to major legal systems.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). One area in
which the application of joint enterprise principles has been controversial, however, involves
liability of passengers for the acts of drivers. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 72, at 517–22 (5th ed. 1984); Fleming James, Jr., Vicarious Liability, 28
TUL. L. REV. 161, 210–15 (1954) (criticizing the application of joint enterprise in the driverpassenger context).
71. See, e.g., Matthew T. Bodie, Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 661, 709 (2013) (“Firms are liable for the actions of their employees not because the
employees were being controlled, but because the employees were part of a joint enterprise, and
that enterprise should bear the costs created by its participants.”) (emphasis added); cf. Lewis A.
Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and Personal Liability for
Accidents, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1345, 1370 (1982) (reasoning that a shift to enterprise liability will
lead to a greater level of care by principals). For case examples, see Shell Oil Co. v. Prestidge,
249 F.2d 413, 415–17 (9th Cir. 1957); Kirby Lumber Corp. v. Karpel, 233 F.2d 373, 374–76 (5th
Cir. 1956). Interestingly, Professor Bodie appears to treat employer-employee vicarious liability
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Thus, even in the absence of explicit codification in the Patent Act, the
Federal Circuit’s acceptance of the joint enterprise form of attribution in
patent law is reasonable because this doctrine seems to solve similar
problems throughout various areas of law, and is one on which courts
have converged because it makes economic sense. 72 Professor
Robinson’s conclusion that imposition of liability under the joint
enterprise theory is consistent with all three leading economic theories of
patent law is therefore unsurprising. 73
Yet there is another doctrine, just as well-established as joint
enterprise and as highly relevant to divided infringement, which the
Federal Circuit seems to have neglected. This doctrine, which I described
in detail in Causal Responsibility and Patent Infringement, is called
“innocent agency.” 74 While it rarely tends to be identified by this label
outside of criminal law, this doctrine is a ubiquitous route to imposing
liability in both tort and criminal cases. 75 In short, the doctrine attributes
to a defendant the act element of an offense that the defendant has caused
to be performed by another. 76 For example, when a defendant requests
that a third party enter the land of another, the third party’s act is
attributed to the requester, who becomes liable for the trespass. 77 Or,
as a subset as joint enterprise liability—and one of the dissenting opinions in Akamai appears to
treat joint enterprise liability as a subset of vicarious liability. See Akamai Techs., Inc. v.
Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Linn, J., dissenting),
rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014) (stating that “[t]he vicarious liability test also reaches joint
enterprises acting together to infringe a patent”). One way to reconcile these positions is to say
that the legal consequence of a finding of joint enterprise is vicarious liability of the members of
the enterprise for one another’s tortious acts performed in furtherance of the enterprise.
72. See supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text.
73. See Robinson, supra note 1, at 2028.
74. See generally Karshtedt, supra note 13. One of the Akamai opinions, to be sure,
mentioned “an innocent intermediary.” Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d
1301, 1311, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014). However, the Federal
Circuit had actually departed from the innocent agency doctrine by treating the underlying
doctrine as a form of “inducement” liability. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
75. See Karshtedt, supra note 13, at 600–21, 624–25.
76. Id. at 574. In patent cases, therefore, this doctrine would assign liability to defendants
who performed some claim steps themselves and caused another entity to perform the rest, and to
defendants who performed no steps but caused two or more entities to perform all the claim steps
between them. Cf. supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing these scenarios in the context
of the “partial-inducement” test, Test C).
77. Karshtedt, supra note 13, at 615–17. This theory applies in the circumstances in which
the person who actually enters the land has no reason to believe that he or she must seek
permission from the owner. See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Tempting Trespass or Suggesting
Sociability?, 51 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 731, 739 (2017) (“[A]n important reason not to hold entities
strictly liable for aiding and encouraging entries to land by third parties is that one might
reasonably expect those third parties to seek and receive permission to enter—especially where
the defendant instructed them to ask permission or to avoid trespassing.”).
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when a defendant supplies a defective product to a user and the product
causes damage during its normal operation, the user’s damage-causing
act is attributed to the supplier. 78
This doctrine differs from actual agency because the third party is
under no obligation to the defendant to perform any act—nor is the third
party in the defendant’s employ or under its supervision. 79 Nonetheless,
because of information asymmetries between the defendant and the third
party as well as other factors, such as the defendant’s greater control over
the relevant circumstances and the relative passivity of the third party,
courts are comfortable with act-imputation in these scenarios. 80 The
imputation mechanism, rooted in the notion of causal responsibility,
results in the imposition of direct liability on the defendant. 81 There are
ample economic justifications for this rule, some of which mirror the
rationales underlying the collapse of privity as a limitation on tort
liability. 82
The economic efficiency of innocent agency is difficult to question.
Indeed, the doctrine might be a prime example of the common law’s
convergence on an efficient rule, and one that is also amply justified by
fairness considerations. 83 Based on these features, we might expect that
innocent agency would serve the purposes of efficiency in patent law. 84
As I argued in Causal Responsibility and Patent Infringement, the
doctrine can cleanly resolve many manufacturer-user and doctor-patient
divided infringement cases, 85 for which vicarious liability has not been
an easy fit, 86 based on the difference in the expertise with respect to the
patented technology between “active” manufacturers and doctors on the
one hand, and “passive” users and patients on the other. However,
innocent agency has not found yet its way into patent cases. As I
suggested in the article, the way the Federal Circuit has lately deployed
vicarious liability, i.e., Test A2, might just be innocent agency by another
name. 87 But, without seeing further case law developments that apply the
Federal Circuit’s new take on the vicarious liability doctrine in practice,
78. Karshtedt, supra note 13, at 617–21.
79. Id. at 572.
80. Id. at 628.
81. Id. at 609.
82. Id. at 618–19.
83. Id. at 574, 609, 645–46.
84. Cf. Sichelman, supra note 16 (arguing that patent law should be viewed as part of a
regulatory regime designed to promote innovation); see also Karshtedt, supra note 5 (proposing
an approach to enhanced patent damages derived from the common law and arguing that it would
serve the goals of economic efficiency).
85. See Karshtedt, supra note 13, at 636–41.
86. See supra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
87. See Karshtedt, supra note 13, at 571.
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one cannot really be sure.
I contend here that, just as the joint enterprise test (Test B), the
innocent agency rule should be embraced in divided infringement cases
because it is consistent with the three leading theories of patent
protection. Before applying Professor Robinson’s framework to innocent
agency, however, it is worth noting briefly that neither Test C (the
“partial-inducement” test briefly in place until the Supreme Court
reversed the Federal Circuit) nor Test D (Judge Newman’s “all-steps” test
that was never adopted by a majority of the court) has a strong precedent
in the common law. 88 It is therefore unsurprising that, according to
Professor Robinson, neither Test C nor Test D fits all three dominant
theories of patent protection. 89 But innocent agency, like joint enterprise,
is different.
First, innocent agency, which I call “Test X” to underscore the point
that it has not yet been applied in patent infringement cases, is consistent
with the reward theory as deployed within the framework of Professor
Robinson’s article. 90 This theory “recommends that the social benefit of
granting an applicant a patent must outweigh the social cost of being
subject to the resulting limited patent monopoly.” 91 According to
Professor Robinson, assignment of liability under Test B is proper under
the reward theory because that result allows the patentee “to exclude free
riders from benefiting from a patent without licensing the claimed
technology.” 92 As with liability under Test B, which functions to “prevent
a group of participants from appropriating a pecuniary benefit from
practicing another’s invention,” 93 Test X prevents free-riding by holding
a defendant liable for performing claim steps in conjunction with a
passive “causee” 94—a third party whose own claim step performance was
made possible by the defendant’s actions. 95 Indeed, by targeting
defendants providing tools whose only utility lies in carrying out steps
that result in the completion of a method claimed in an asserted patent,
Test X (like Test B) denies the defendant a “benefit from the performance

88. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.
89. Robinson, supra note 1, at 2014–29.
90. For a discussion of the principles underlying the reward theory of patents, see generally
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM (Comm. Print 1958).
91. Robinson, supra note 1, at 1969.
92. Id. at 2018.
93. Id. at 2017.
94. Karshtedt, supra note 13, at 609, 624.
95. Cf. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 693 (7th ed. 2017) (“[D]oes it make sense to say that a patented process
such as Akamai’s is being widely used in the U.S. economy but no one is actually using it?”).
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of a claimed method without licensing the invention.” 96
Although these conclusions might not address the larger question of
whether enforcement of some particular patent or class of patents
provides the socially optimal amount of incentives, 97 the analysis at least
confirms that Test X, like Test B, results in liability only when the
defendant intends to derive a benefit from the entire claimed method,98
as opposed to the unpatented fragment of the method. Accordingly, just
as with Test B, imposition of liability under Test X makes economic
sense under the reward theory within Professor Robinson’s framework.
Second, Test X is consistent with the prospect theory, which “says
that an inventor is granted a patent in order to cultivate the claimed

96. Robinson, supra note 1, at 2018. Interestingly, the Federal Circuit employs a kind of a
“benefits” test for act-attribution in divided infringement cases. But the test seems backwards
from the common-law vicarious-liability approach, focusing on the benefits obtained by the user
rather than the party that the plaintiff wishes to hold liable—the defendant-manufacturer. See
Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc)
(per curiam); see also supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text.
97. The analysis in the Response assumes, for example, that patents giving rise to divided
infringement issues are otherwise correctly granted—in other words, in compliance with the
various patentability requirements. An argument is sometimes made that patents that are difficult
to enforce under the divided infringement doctrine are weak patents to begin with. See, e.g., Daniel
Fisher, Supreme Court Slaps Loose Business-Method Patents, Federal Circuit in Rulings, FORBES
(June 2, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2014/06/02/supreme-court-slapsloose-business-method-patents-federal-circuit-in-rulings/#27f89524595e. While that might be
true, “invalidation” of a patent through non-enforcement seems like a crude way to solve this
problem—particularly when the patent has duly issued and survived invalidity challenges in
litigation, and the underlying method has been beneficially deployed by others. And it is far from
a given that such patents are weak or unnecessary. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 1, at 1981–83,
2018; see also W. Keith Robinson, Only a Pawn in the Game: Rethinking Induced Patent
Infringement, 32 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 43 (2015) (“[W]eak patent protection in this
area could discourage investors from investing in start-ups and companies developing interactive
technology.”). I thank Professor Kevin Collins for a discussion that helped me clarify these points.
98. The relevant level of mens rea would not require intent to actually violate a legal right,
but only intent that certain acts be performed by another party. See Karshtedt, supra note 13, at
604–06; cf. Saurabh Vishnubhakat, An Intentional Tort Theory of Patents, 68 FLA. L. REV. 571
(2016) (discussing the role of intent in a related context). For a response to Professor
Vishnubhakat, see Patrick R. Goold, Intent in Patent Infringement, 68 FLA. L. REV. F. 72 (2017).
The question whether direct patent infringement should be “strict liability” or require some form
of fault based on efficiency principles is a matter of debate. Compare Samson
Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475
(2006), with Robert P. Merges, A Few Kind Words for Absolute Infringement Liability in Patent
Law, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1 (2016). To be clear, however, principles of causal responsibility
and of joint enterprise apply to strict liability torts just as they do to others. See supra note 68 and
accompanying text; see also Henley v. Mazda Motor Corp., 609 N.W.2d 203 (Mich. App. 2000)
(exemplifying a products liability case involving a joint venture).
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subject matter free from interference of competitors.” 99 Again, the
similarities to Professor Robinson’s conclusions regarding the effects of
Test B are instructive. He reasons that Test B enables patentees to
“enforce multiparty claims against competitors who joined forces to
appropriate the benefits of their invention[s],” thereby “allow[ing]
inventors to commercialize their invention[s] free from competitive
interference.” 100 By way of contrast, Professor Robinson criticizes Test
A1 as inconsistent with the prospect theory because it is satisfied “in such
a limited set of conditions that wasteful efforts of competitors may not
necessarily be minimized” 101—and criticizes the “partial-inducement”
Test C as similarly overly-restrictive due to its requirement of knowledge
of the underlying patent. 102
Instead, like the joint-enterprise Test B, Test X allows for liability
even in the absence of a contractual or agency relationship between the
defendant and the third party, as well as in the absence of mens rea other
than intent to cause the third party to perform an act corresponding to an
element of a patent claim. 103 This more robust approach to enforcement
would move the divided infringement regime toward consistency with
the prospect theory by “discourag[ing] competitors from either seeking
patents on similar technology or producing competing products,” 104 just
as Test B does. Indeed, Professor Robinson concludes that, relative to
Test A1 or Test C, liability for infringement of interactive patents under
Test B would strengthen claim enforcement by “minimiz[ing] wasteful
competition.” 105 Liability under Test X would achieve a similar result by
effectively maintaining enforceability of patent claims in cases in which
the interaction between the defendant and the third party is occurring via
provision of specialized tools, drugs, or other products that the defendant
designed, or at least with respect to which the defendant is expected to
possess some expertise. Thus, as with Test B, enforcement of interactive
patens under Test X is in line with the prospect theory.
Finally, Test X is consistent with the rent-dissipation theory, which
holds “that patents should be enforced against infringing products that
99. Robinson, supra note 1, at 2020. For a leading article on the prospect theory, see
generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265
(1977).
100. Robinson, supra note 1, at 2022.
101. See id. at 2020–21.
102. See id. at 2021.
103. See Karshtedt, supra note 13, at 604–06, 609, 613–14.
104. Robinson, supra note 1, at 2021; see also Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent
Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305 (1992). For a further analysis and critique of the
rent dissipation theory, see generally Robert P. Merges, Rent Control in the Patent District:
Observations on the Grady-Alexander Thesis, 78 VA. L. REV. 359 (1992).
105. Robinson, supra note 1, at 2023.
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fall within the asserted patent’s signaled improvements.” 106 Briefly, “rent
dissipation is defined as the total expenditure of resources by all agents
attempting to capture a rent or prize,” 107 such as a patent, and minimizing
rent dissipation is generally thought to be a good thing. 108 Proponents of
the rent dissipation theory’s role in explaining certain aspects of patent
law maintain that patenting can generate three principal scenarios in
which rent dissipation is possible. First, one might see “numerous,
redundant, development efforts” in pursuit of obtaining a patent right. 109
Second, and particularly relevant for the purposes of Professor
Robinson’s article, socially undesirable activity might occur when a
patented invention “signal[s] ways in which that invention might be
improved, causing other inventors to redundantly waste efforts to find
and capitalize on that method of improvement.” 110 Nonetheless, if the
patent can actually be enforced against the signaled improvements, “the
incentive to engage in wasteful improvement efforts” 111 would be
reduced. 112 Third, the absence of patent protection (or enforcement) in
certain circumstances might dissipate rents by encouraging overinvestment in secrecy. 113
Applying the rent-dissipation theory, Professor Robinson faults Test
A1 for “provid[ing] a clear roadmap for competitors seeking to avoid
liability for infringement,” 114 even where the activity “falls within a
patent’s signaled improvements.” 115 He also criticizes Test A1 for
offering so little in the way of incentivizing the patenting of (and inducing
disclosure of) interactive methods that inventors would be expected to
opt for secrecy to protect such inventions. 116 In contrast, Professor
Robinson concludes that Test B is consistent with the rent-dissipation
theory because it allows for enforcement of patent claims that “signal
other possible components or users that could be integrated into a claimed
106. Id. at 2024.
107. Terrance M. Hurley, Rent Dissipation and Efficiency in a Contest with Asymmetric
Valuations, 94 PUB. CHOICE 289, 289 (1998).
108. See MATTHEW FISHER, FUNDAMENTALS OF PATENT LAW: INTERPRETATION AND SCOPE
OF PROTECTION 158–60 (2007) (evaluating this claim).
109. See Grady & Alexander, supra note 104, at 308.
110. Id. Such activity may occur without the knowledge of the underlying patent—all that is
required is the knowledge that there is technology out there that can be improved and potentially
patented by the improver. See id.
111. Id.
112. It is perhaps the focus on signaling that principally distinguishes the rent-dissipation
theory from the prospect theory.
113. See Grady & Alexander, supra note 104, at 308–09.
114. Robinson, supra note 1, at 2024.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 2025–26.
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system or method” 117 and “facilitate collaboration.” 118 Finally, he notes
that the more robust protection would channel inventors of these
technologies toward patenting and therefore disclosure, 119 as opposed to
wasteful investments in secrecy.
Test X, unlike Test B, focuses on the enforcement of claims that deal
with relationships that are less collaborative and more focused on
unidirectional dynamics, such as those between manufacturers and
passive customers. 120 Still, interactive patents of this latter sort, like
patents enforced under Test B, signal that “interactivity . . . between
different parties,” 121 such as software maker and user or doctor and
patient, “may be innovative and have commercial value.” 122 Patents
directed to manufacturer-user interactions, almost by definition, highlight
interactivity and can also signal improvements. The underlying
inventions can, for example, spur the development of methods that could
be carried out in different ways by suggesting shifts in whether the
defendant or the third party performs a particular claim step or even by
enlisting additional entities in the performance. Rent dissipation involved
in looking for such improvements would, then, be reduced by the
enforcement of these patents. More generally, patents enforceable under
Test X, as under Test B, could provide the groundwork for development
in emerging areas like personalized medicine and the “Internet of
Things” 123 and facilitate the disclosure and dissemination of information
pertinent to these technologies, thereby also reducing rent dissipation due
to secrecy. 124 Enforcement of interactive patents under Text X, therefore,
results in rent dissipation.
CONCLUSION
Professor Robinson’s article contributes valuably to the literature by
providing, based on three leading theories of patent protection, a rigorous
economic analysis of the various tests (by my count, at least four) that
courts or individual judges have put forward for act-attribution in divided
117. Id. at 2027.
118. Id.
119. See id.; cf. Dmitry Karshtedt, Photocopies, Patents, and Knowledge Transfer: “The
Uneasy Case” of Justice Breyer’s Patentable Subject Matter Jurisprudence, 69 VAND. L. REV.
1739, 1743–44 (2016) (summarizing the literature on patent disclosure).
120. See Karshtedt, supra note 13, at 634–36.
121. Robinson, supra note 1, at 2021.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 1981–83.
124. It appears that “maintenance of secrecy,” in the absence of patent protection, should be
possible with some technologies that would give rise to divided infringement problems if
patented. See Grady & Alexander, supra note 104, at 342; Karshtedt, supra note 119, at 1746–47,
1775–76.
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infringement cases. In this rapidly changing area of law, the Federal
Circuit recently introduced an arguably new, fifth test as Professor
Robinson’s article went to press. 125 The contours of this test are,
unfortunately, somewhat unclear and difficult to understand in the
abstract, with only limited case law applying the test. A part of the
problem is that, even though the test is denominated “vicarious liability,”
it does not closely resemble vicarious liability in the common law of torts
and is therefore not fully amenable to analysis under general economic
considerations justifying vicarious liability. 126
This Response considers an alternative test, based on causal
responsibility and its manifestation via the doctrine of innocent agency,
which I applied to patent law in a recent article. 127 Like the joint
enterprise test, favored by Professor Robinson because of its consistency
with the three leading economic theories of patent law, the causal
responsibility approach is deeply rooted in the common law and has been
justified by both efficiency and justice considerations. My brief analysis
of how this latter test addresses the problem of divided infringement
following on Professor Robinson’s framework concludes that it, too, is
consistent with the three leading economic theories of patent law.
This is not surprising. The common law sometimes tends to converge
on economically efficient rules and, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, such rules should be a good fit for patent law—which is
concerned with economic efficiency above all else. Courts have
implicitly recognized these virtues of the joint enterprise rule when they
adopted it as a theory of act-attribution. They should do the same with the
causal responsibility test, which has those same virtues and a strong
foundation in the common law.

125. See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020, 1023 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (en banc) (per curiam).
126. See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text; see also Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden
and Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1755–64
(1996).
127. See supra notes 74–84 and accompanying text. See generally Karshtedt, supra note 13.

